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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
UDOTfs Petition in this matter is replete with misstate-
ments of fact. Because the problem extends beyond its State-
ment of Facts, several corrections will be noted at this point; 
others will be covered subsequently in this brief. 
UDOT's references that a "full evidentiary trial11 (Pet.2) 
and a "full presentation of evidence by both sides" (Pet. 1) 
took place at the District Court trial are certainly in-
appropriate and incorrect inasmuch as its counsel removed from 
the Court and denied Judge Hyde access to critical Exhibits 
D-14, D-15 and D-16; likewise,its statement that another District 
Court trial (the Toone case) involved the "exact same issues" 
(Pet. 5) is not so, as the Court of Appeals noted in its decision, 
and the further statement that "Toonefs interest (in the property 
involved in that litigation) was terminated..." (Pet. 4) is a 
volunteered and disputed conclusion immaterial to this case. 
The Record fails to give any support to UDOT's assertion 
that Dansie was "the recorded owner" (Pet, 4) of the 24.41 
acres contained in his "Warranty Deed to UDOT (Pet. 4--and 
see Exh. P-12); actually, that deed described 18.00 acres 
owned by Dansie (which was really in Davis Co.) and 6.41 acres 
owned by Utah Sand & Gravel Co. (which, also, was located 
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south of the 18.00-acre tract in Davis County). See Exh. P-7. 
UDOT asserts that these Respondents, as plaintiffs below, 
also sued Davis and Weber Counties in this Cuiet Title action 
(Pet. 4). The Record is otherwise: Only UDOT was a named defendant 
(R. 1-5); but it was UDOT^s a Third-Party Plaintiff, which in 
turn sued Davis County, Weber County and Dansie as Third-Party 
Defendants. Also, the Court of Appeals decision did not "conclude 
that a metes and bounds description existed of the location of the 
main channel of the Weber River prior to 1894" as asserted by 
UDOT (Pet. 10). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UDOT'S PETITION CONSISTS OF NOTHING MORE THAN AN ATTEMPT 
TO ADVANCE THE SAME ERRONEOUS LEGAL CLAIMS AND TO 
MISREPRESENT THE FACTS IN AN EFFORT TO RE-ARGUE ITS CASE 
UNDER THE GUISE OF A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
This litigation focuses on a 6.00-acre tract of land purchased 
by respondent Baxter and others at a Davis County tax sale. The 
subject property is located on a delta area at the mouth of Weber 
Canyon where the westerly flowing Weber River emerges from the 
canyon. Interstate Freeway 1-84 and the main line of the Union 
Pacific Railroad also traverse the area in a westerly direction 
from the mouth of the canyon. The territorial legislature of Utah 
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established the boundary line between Weber and Davis Counties 
in that area as being the main channel of the Weber River. 
Petitioner UDOT contends that the 6.00-acre tract is in 
Weber County and that Davis County had no authority to tax 
and sell the land because it was located in Weber County. The 
Weber River now flows on the south side of the subject property, 
but Respondents contend that, at the time the boundary line was 
established and at least until diverted by a manmade dike some-
time after 1886 and before 1894, the Weber River was flowing 
in its entirety on the north side of the subject property, 
thereby placing the land in Davis County. Thus, the critical 
issue in this case can be simply stated: 
At the time the territorial legislature established 
the boundary between Weber and Davis counties to be 
the main channel of the Weber River, was the subject 
property located north (Weber County side) or south 
(Davis County side) of the river. 
It was brought out at the trial through the testimony of 
four surveyors on both sides (R.580-581, Tr. 27-28; 629, 
Tr. 76; 646-647, Tr.93-94; and 709-710, Tr. 156-157) that 
their interpretations of three official surveys made in 
1855, 1871 and 1866 by the U.S. Surveyor General) Exhs. P-15, 
P-16 and P-17) placed the entire flow of the Weber River in 
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all of those years at a basic location north of subject property 
and that the surveys (which ran at approximately right angles to 
the westerly gradient of the area lands) extended more than 700 
feet south of the-present location of the Weber River without 
really revealing so much as a dry channel which might have 
suggested an ancient river flow. 
UDOT prevailed upon Judge Hyde, who heard the case without 
a jury, to rule in its favor because these Respondents had not 
located an "exact11 location of the original channel of the Weber 
River by a "metes-and-boundsff description. 
Judge Hyde was further restricted in arriving at his decision 
because UDOT's counsel purposely removed (R. 581-583) three 
critical Exhibits (D-14-D-15 and D-16) from the courtroom and 
took them to his office, and Judge Hyde never actually saw them 
nor did he have them in his possession while having the case 
under advisement. Those Exhibits, which were also made from the 
official U. S. government surveys by the Surveyor General in 
the years 1855, 1871 and 1886, all located the entire flow of 
the Weber River to the north of the subject tract. 
In an argument before Judge Hyde after this matter had 
gone up on appeal, wherein the issue related to the three 
missing exhibits which UD0Tfs counsel removed from the Court, 
Mr. Ward made the following admission: 
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MR. FULLER: Now, generally when we have these river 
boundary situations, we determine where is the main channel. 
In this case, however, the main channel is mute (sic). Both 
by these three exhibits and by the testimony and admissions 
of their three experts, as well as my man, Mr. Baxter, all 
of the channels were north of this property in 1866 and therefs 
no Court, therefs nobody that can get around that. 
MR. WARD: Your Honor, we're not objecting to that. 
Thatfs so --
MR. FULLER: Then they have no case. (R. 576-577) 
Also, in an argument before the Court of Appeals, counsel 
for UDOT again admitted that the entire flow of the river 
was north of the subject property prior to 1886, but continued 
to maintain (as he now does-- (Pet. 2, 8 and 10)) that these 
Respondents had failed to establish an "exact" location of 
the main channel of the river by a "metes and bounds" descrip-
tion. The Court of Appeals rejected UDOT's argument, recogniz-
ing (among other reasons) that the issue of where the center 
line of the main channel of the river may have been located 
was immaterial to its decision once it had been agreed by 
everyone that the entire flow of the river was north of the 
subject property when the county lines were established. 
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UDOT contended (and now contends) that a joint survey 
along the Weber River channel (in its diverted location) made 
by both counties in 1894, invoked a special statutory provision 
for the establishment of disputed or uncertain county boundaries, 
claiming that "in 1893 a definite uncertainty existed as to the 
location of the main channel of the Weber River"(Pet. 3). Here, 
too, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the survey was not 
conducted to resolve a dispute and that, even if such had occurred, 
UDOT is back to square one since Utah court decisions and estab-
lished boundary-line law placed the factual determination to which 
the surveyors must adhere right back to the date when the territ-
orial legislature established the boundary line between the two 
counties--not 1894. 
UDOT further contends in Point II of its Petition that the 
Court of Appeals "wrongfully concluded" that a 1946 Quiet Title 
action placed the subject 6.00 acres in Davis County, relying on 
a self-serving "map" which it prepared and which purportedly 
showed the properties to be located in both counties. But it shoxild 
be pointed out that UD0Tfs "Exhibit C" was not a trial exhibit; 
it was prepared by UDOT long before trial as part of a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Further, the "Exhibit C" did not show the 
location of the Weber River through the SW% of Section 25. The 
Decree , a certified copy of which is found in the record, reads 
as follows: 
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The property affected by this decree lying in the County 
of Weber, State of Utah, is bounded and described as follows, 
to-wit: 
That portion of the Southwest Quarter of Section 
25, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian, U.S. Survey, lying North of Weber 
River and South of the Union Pacific Railroad 
Company's right-of-way. 
The property affected by this decree lying in the 
County of Davis, State of Utah, is bounded and described 
as follows, to-wit; 
The South One-half of the North Half of the South-
west Quarter of Section 25, and the Southeast 
Ouarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 25, 
Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
U. S. Survey. 




The 1946 Quiet Title Decree didn't attempt to locate 
the meander of the "old" channel of the Weber River as it 
traversed the S% of the N% of the SW% of Sec. 25 as estab-
lished by the territorial legislature, so the Davis County 
Assessor proceeded to do so by preparing a detailed Plat 
Map (found in its Recorder's Office) which showed the "old11 
channel of the river, outlined in color, as it traversed 
the SE% and SW% of Section 25. From the area in the S % of 
the N% of SW%, Davis County determined that 18.00 acres lay 
within its jurisdiction, and it taxed the land continuously 
since at least 1946 and until sold for taxes. The Plat Map 
was offered and received in evidence without objection at 
the trial-- Exh. P-7. 
The Court of Appeals did not commit error in disregarding 
UD0Tfs interpretation of the 1946 Quiet Title action and its 
self-serving, incomplete and erroneous lf Exhibit C. 
UDOT next contends that the Court of Appeals erred in 
refusing to bifurcate the case, thus denying it an oppor-
tunity to litigate the issue of the tax sale proceedings and, 
apparently other defenses also raised in its Answer and Third-
Party Complaint. At the outset, these Respondents take issue 
with UD0Tfs assertion (Pet. 5) that "it was always assumed by 
the parties that the present action would ...be bifurcated.ff 
No such understanding ever existed; no such assumption can be 
made from the Record in this case, or otherwise. The Record can 
be carefully searched without finding anything wherein these 
Respondents acknowledged or intimated anything other than that 
the trial before Judge Hyde included all issues, just as Judge 
Roth outlined them at Pretrial (R. 20--37-44). Respondents argued 
at the trial level that title should be quieted in them, and 
they prayed for the same relief in their appeal brief. 
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Contrary to UDOTfs statement in its Petition at page 4, 
these Respondents did not sue Davis County and Weber County«, 
Respondents filed their Complaint (R. 1-5) solely against 
UDOT; thereafter, UDOT, as a Third-Party Plaintiff, sued 
Dansie (its grantor) and both Weber and Davis counties, as 
Third-Party Defendants. (See caption of this action and the 
Pretrial transcript Exh. P-20 at Pp 3-4,10-11,15-16, 19) 
UDOT specifically sued Davis County, seeking relief, if 
Baxters should recover from UDOT, "equal to the fair market value 
value of the subject property ".because "Davis County did not 
follow the necessary statutory procedures to sell the property 
even if it was located in Davis County," and to "void out 
the tax deed." 
Curiously, at Pretrial it became evident from the above-
referenced transcript citations that UDOT, Weber County and 
Davis County had reached a mutual accommodation and that an 
understanding existed whereby UDOT would not pursue the tax 
sale matter against Davis County. This, notwithstanding 
that both Weber and Davis counties had filed their Answers 
to the Third-Party Complaint joining issue with UDOT. During 
the trial before Judge Hyde, UDOT's counsel was flanked at 
counsel table by counsel representing both counties, and 
they now represent both counties on UDOT's appeal brief and 
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on this Petition. 
Under the circumstances, it seems unusual that UDOT should 
now seek to challenge the Davis County tax sale proceedings. 
Somehow, it would appear that UDOT and Davis County may have 
compromised their positions; in any event, any proceeding 
attacking the Davis County tax sale would undoubtedly be high-
ly prejudicial to these Respondents at this point and the 
situation would certainly raise serious questions of due 
process. 
UDOT did not pursue its Third Party Complaint against 
Dansie--not even to the point of seeking a reformation of 
its invalid deed (which UDOT prepared). Consequently, it does not 
have legal title (i.e.,a record title supported by a chain of 
title). See H.O.L.C. v. Dudleyq05 U.208,141 P.2d 160 (1943) and 
Mercur Coalition Min. Co. v. Cannon, 112 U. 13,184 P.2d 341 
(1947). The weakness of its title wonft prevail against parties 
(Respondents here) who make out a prima facie case by intro-
ducing their tax title in evidence (Exhs. 2,3, 4 and 5). See 
Smith v. Nelson, 114 U. 51, 197 P.2d 132 (1948)• 
If the Davis County tax sale were to be declared void and 
invalid simply because the land may have been located in Weber 
County, by the same logic--and consistent with the concept of 
mutuality of remedy--UDOTfs Weber County-ownership deed, departing 
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from a Davis County chain of title, would hardly seem to be 
an adequate basis to attack a Davis County tax title. 
POINT II 
WHETHER THE TERRITORIAL LEGISLATURE ESTABLISHED THE 
CHANNEL OF THE WEBER RIVER AS THE DIVISION LINE 
BETWEEN WEBER AND DAVIS COUNTIES IN 1866 OR IN 1855 
IS AN IMMATERIAL FACTOR IN THE DECISION OF THE COURT 
OF APPEALS. 
Once recognized that the territorial legislature 
established the main channel of the Weber River as the 
boundary line between the two counties, the only difference 
that using the year 1866 (the date used at trial) or 1855 
(as determined by the Court of Appeals) could possibly have 
on the outcome of the litigation would be if the river!s 
main channel was located south of the subject property in 
1855. That the river was north of the subject property in 
the same area without substantial deviation at the time of 
the 1855, 1871 and 1886 surveys was recognized by UDOT's 
three appraisers and respondent Ronald Baxter: 
UDOT's witness Max B. Elliott,Davis County Surveyor--
Q. My other question, in any of the surveys conducted 
by the United States Surveyor General, in either 
1855, 1871 or 1886, did you find in any of those 
surveys, any water of the Weber River located 
south of the Baxter tract shown on Exhibit Pi? 
A. Not on those notes. 
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Qe On those notes. And until 1894, you found no 
indication of water south of the tract until that 
f94 survey came about, did you? 
A. I found nothing on that prior to the 1894 survey, 
thatfs correct. 
(Tr. 27-28 — R. 580-581) 
UD0Tfs witness John P. Reeve, Weber County Surveyor-
s'. But you didn't find any water as of 1855 or 1871 
flowing on the south of this property, did you? 
A. No. 
(Tr. 76 — R. 629) 
UD0Tfs witness Jack L. DeMass, an engineer and surveyor — 
Q. All right. Did you find anything in the Surveyor 
Generalfs notes to indicate that there were old 
channels south of the channel located some 22 chains 
north of the section comer of this southwest corner? 
A. No. 
Q. No channels were indicated, were they? 
A. No. 
(Tr. 93-94—R. 646-647) 
Plaintiff Ronald L. Baxter, an engineer and surveyor— 
Q. Now some general questions. On the three surveys that 
you ran or that the government ran, excuse me, and 
that you plotted, did you find any river indication 
that was common to all three surveys? 
A. Yes. The area at approximately 34 and a half chains 
showed the main channel of the Weber River on all three 
surveys with slight variance. 
(Tr. 156-157--R.709-710) 
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Q. Now, as you have reviewed the survey notes for 
all the years,was there any indication up through 
1886, that there was any portion of the Weber 
River at a point roughly 715 feet north of the 
southwest quarter of section 25. 
A. No,there was no river in that location at that time. 
0. None at all? 
(Tr. 158--R.711) 
The official U. S. survey notes and~the map taken 
therefrom, as prepared by the Surveyor General, establish 
beyond any doubt that the Weber River was north of the 
subject property in the year 1855. Exhs. D-14 and P-16 
accurately reflect the situation in the year 1855 and 
leave no room for error. 
The subject property was located in Davis County in 1855. 
SUMMARY 
UDOT concludes its argument seeking a writ by suggesting 
that "something was presented to the Court of Appeals that 
created some sort of bias or prejudice in this case11 (Pet. 10). 
If that Courtfs refusal to accept UD0Tfs unsupported and self-
made concepts of county boundary-line law was intended by the 
quoted statement, it is understandable that the Court of 
Appeals might ultimately lose patience with UD0Tfs obdurant 
refusal to accept rather simple and logical legal principles 
applicable to this case. But the quoted statement undoubtedly 
was really intended as an oblique reference to <the "inex-
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plicable,f personal conduct of UDOTfs counsel in withholding 
critical Exhibits D-14, D-15 and D-16 until directed to do so 
by the Court of Appeals after oral argument. Such conduct must 
certainly be annoying to any court, especially when it emanates 
from Utah's highest governmental legal staff. 
Nor was the author of this brief, as counsel for Respondents, 
pleased with the attempt by UDOT's counsel to shift the blame for 
the disappearance of the missing Exhibits to the undersigned 
(Transcript-R. 567-581) or the reference—a single case citation — 
in the Petition to the case of UDOT v. Glen E. Fuller, et al., 
603 P.2d 814, which contained no legal principle relevant to this 
case (Pet.6), but, instead, was obviously intended by Mr. Ward to 
convey some subliminal message to this Court. 
Under the circumstances, Mr. Ward's removal and withholding 
of the three critical Exhibits from two courts can only be con-
sidered as an admission that UDOT had no case and that he was 
deliberately attempting to thwart justice. The critical comment 
made by the Court of Appeals relating to such conduct was certainly 
justified. 
Nor does counselfs conduct find justification as some kind 
of mistake or first-time occurrence. In the case of UDOT v. Rayco 
Corporation.599 P.2d 481 ( Utah - 1979), a condemnation case in 
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Weber County,where the property owner was represented by 
another member of the Utah Bar, Mr. Ward removed critical 
evidence from the trial court under circumstances sub-
stantially similar to what occurred in this case. This Court 
in that case, referring to Mr. Ward's actions ( p.491), 
commented at length, stating that ffThe actions of State 
counsel cannot be condoned11 and that "it is not within the 
ambit of his duty to engage in deceitful or oppressive tactics 
to deprive a condemnee of his constitutional right of just 
cotobe?isation, Art. I,Sec. 22, Constitution of Utah.11 
Utah Sand & Gravel Co. (now Monroe, Inc.) will undoubted-
ly seek to quiet title to the 6.41 acres included in the 24.41-
acre description contained in the defective deed from Dansie 
to UDOT, using its own counsel. Otherwise, there is nothing 
in the Record to suggest that "utter chaos11 will exist if the 
decision of the Court of Appeals is upheld, as Petitioner 
contends (Pet.11). 
This is not a case which even remotely meets the discre-
tionary guidelines for review set forth in Rule 43 of the 
Rules of the Supreme Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted3 
GLEN E. FULLER 
Attorney for Respondents 
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